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I. INTRODUCTION
Society is forced to deal with the inevitable side effects of expansion as it continues to grow. The continual increase in litigation is
one of these side effects, and it has strained the resources of our judicial system. Litigation is slow and expensive as court dockets become
more crowded. This rise in litigation has led society to explore alternative means of dispute resolution. Today, Alternative Dispute Resolution1 is a burgeoning field of study that encompasses many aspects
of society.
Mediation is a popular form of ADR that has been used to settle
disputes in courts, public agencies, and between private parties.2
Mediation is “a process in which a mediator facilitates communication and negotiation between parties to assist them in reaching a
voluntary agreement regarding their dispute.”3 The introduction of
the mediator as a neutral third party is an integral part of the mediation process.4 In order for the mediation to have a chance at reaching a settlement, there are generally two prerequisites: first, the parties must have faith in the mediator’s neutrality and, second, they
* J.D. Candidate May 2003, Florida State University College of Law; B.S., Political
Science, Florida State University. I would like to dedicate this Comment to my wife, Erin,
whose love and support has made all of this possible. I would like to acknowledge Chasity
O’Steen and the rest of the Law Review staff for all of their help throughout the editing
process.
1. Hereinafter “ADR.”
2. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Prefatory Note (2001); see also Mindy D. Rufenacht, Comment, The Concern Over Confidentiality in Mediation—An In-Depth Look at the Protection
Provided by the Proposed Uniform Mediation Act, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 113, 113 (“Support
for mediation has increased dramatically over the last twenty years, and now there are
more than 2000 federal and state statutes regulating the field.") (footnote omitted).
3. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 2(1) (2001).
4. Greg Dillard, The Future of Mediation Confidentiality in Texas: Shedding Light on
a Murky Situation, 21 REV. LITIG. 137, 139 (2002).
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must trust in the confidentiality of the process.5 As a fundamental
element of the mediation process, confidentiality has been a hotly
debated topic in the courts and among academia. This debate has
centered more on the individual’s expectation of confidentiality and
its importance to the mediation process than on the court’s interest
in adjudicating all relevant evidence.6
States have differed in the scope and breadth of their use of mediation. Some states require mandatory mediation, while other states
leave the decision to the parties.7 In addition, some states provide
specific statutory enforcement to mediation agreements, but other
states leave enforcement to the law of contracts.8 While most states
have rules relating to mediation in their codes of civil procedure, others choose to expand mediation rules statutorily.9 Confidentiality is
another area in which states have varied greatly.
Part I of this Comment begins with a general review of confidentiality in mediation. The prevailing norms in mediation today are
discussed to show the importance of confidentiality in the process.
Part II focuses on the recently approved Uniform Mediation Act
(UMA)10 and its approach to confidentiality. The UMA is a collaboration of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, which promotes uniformity in mediation by applying a generic
approach to topics that are covered in different ways by many
states.11 This Section discusses the UMA’s approach to confidentiality
and examines several portions of the Act that will have an effect on
confidentiality. Part III briefly analyzes Florida’s current approach to
confidentiality in mediation. Part IV presents the question of what
benefit, if any, Florida can glean from the UMA. This Section focuses
in particular on Florida Senate Bill 1226,12 which was approved
unanimously by the Senate Judiciary and Finance Committees during the 2002 legislative session. Senate Bill 1226, if enacted, will
adopt some changes to mediation confidentiality that conform to the
UMA.13

5. Id.
6. See generally Charles W. Ehrhardt, Confidentiality, Privilege and Rule 408: The
Protection of Mediation Proceedings in Federal Court, 60 LA. L. REV. 91, 102 (1999) (explaining that even the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence were concerned about an
individual’s expectation of privacy).
7. See 1 SARAH R. COLE ET AL., MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY, PRACTICE § 7.1, app. A, B
(2d ed. 2001).
8. Id. § 8.1, app. A, B.
9. Id. § 8.1, app. A.
10. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT (2001).
11. See infra Part II.
12. Fla. CS for SB 1226 (2002).
13. See infra Part IV.
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After arguing that Senate Bill 1226 should ultimately be enacted,
this discussion examines whether Florida should adopt the UMA approach, which grants a specific mediator privilege. This privilege protects the confidentiality of the process by giving the mediator the
right to refuse to testify, and to prevent others from testifying, about
mediation communications.14 This is an area of mediation law in
which the states have varied greatly, and it is a major focus of the
UMA. Ultimately, this Note argues that Florida should adopt the
UMA approach of granting a limited mediator privilege.
II. CONFIDENTIALITY IN MEDIATION
Confidentiality in mediation refers to the ability of a party to keep
the contents of the mediation from being used as evidence at a subsequent legal proceeding.15 This is important, not just from a legal
standpoint, but from a practical perspective. Candor by the parties
can be crucial to a successful mediation.16 As neutral third parties,
mediators use the ability to speak privately to the parties as a tool in
facilitating settlement.17 Mediators attempt to identify the issues and
uncover any underlying causes of conflict with the hope that they can
use this information to encourage the parties to work out their differences.18 Mediators will often use information obtained from their
discussions to craft alternative grounds for settlement.19 During
these discussions, it is inevitable that the participants will be called
upon to discuss facts that they would not normally be willing to concede. Confidentiality is essential to the mediation process; without it,
parties would not be willing to make the kind of concessions and admissions that lead to settlement.20 Therefore, confidentiality allows
the parties to participate effectively and successfully.21
Confidentiality is also important to mediation as a measure to ensure that the proceeding is fair to the parties.22 Parties often communicate in mediations with the expectation that discussions are
confidential.23 After informing the parties that the mediation is confidential, mediators typically have all participants sign a confidenti-

14. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 4(b)(2) (2001).
15. Lawrence Freedman, Confidentiality: A Closer Look, in CONFIDENTIALITY IN
MEDIATION: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 47, 49 (Anne Clare ed., 1985).
16. Lawrence R. Freedman & Michael L. Prigoff, Confidentiality in Mediation: The
Need for Protection, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 37, 38 (1986).
17. Dillard, supra note 4, at 139-40.
18. Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 16, at 38.
19. Id.
20. Christopher DeMayo, The Mediation Privilege and Its Limits, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REV. 383, 394 (2000).
21. Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 16, at 38.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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ality agreement.24 Telling the parties that the mediation will be confidential, however, does not necessarily create a judicially-recognized
protection.25
Courts have often held that confidentiality agreements are unenforceable as a matter of public policy because “[a]greements between
individuals are not permitted to restrict the court’s access to testimony in its pursuit of justice.”26 Most participants in mediation, including the mediator, are unaware of their duty to testify despite the
fact that they have signed confidentiality agreements.27 This false
sense of security leads to unintended disclosures that have drastic
consequences.28 In the interest of fairness, parties should know beforehand what will be disclosed and what will remain confidential;
notice allows parties to plan accordingly.
Confidentiality has significant effects on a mediator’s neutrality.29
Ideally, a mediator should seek to create an atmosphere that encourages an uninhibited flow of information from the participants to the
mediator.30 Knowledge that the mediator might one day be an adversary in court could prevent the participants from confiding during
the mediation.31 This knowledge also hinders the mediator from
building a rapport that is crucial to a successful mediation.32
Despite the importance of confidentiality to the mediation process,
it is at odds with a judicial system that favors consideration of all
relevant evidence.33 Most people recognize the need for some degree
of confidentiality protection, but whether the scope should be broad
or narrow has been the subject of much debate. Some people favor a
narrow privilege, arguing that a broad privilege is unnecessary because of adequate confidentiality protection in existing statutes, contractual agreements, and rules of evidence.34 It is further proposed
that a broad privilege could severely hamper the rights of third parties by preventing the use of relevant evidence.35

24. Rufenacht, supra note 2, at 115.
25. Ehrhardt, supra note 6, at 92.
26. See Rufenacht, supra note 2, at 115 (citing Alan Kirtley, The Mediation Privilege’s
Transition from Theory to Implementation: Designing a Mediation Privilege Standard to
Protect Mediation Participants, the Process, and the Public Interest, 1995 J. DISP. RESOL. 1,
10-11).
27. Maureen A. Weston, Checks on Participant Conduct in Compulsory ADR: Reconciling the Tension in the Need for Good-Faith Participation, Autonomy, and Confidentiality,
76 IND. L.J. 591, 635 (2001).
28. Id.
29. Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 16, at 38.
30. Dillard, supra note 4, at 139.
31. Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 16, at 38.
32. Dillard, supra note 4, at 140.
33. Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 16, at 39.
34. See id.
35. Id. at 40.
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Those that favor a broad privilege find flaws in the argument that
current law provides enough protection when considering that, in
many cases, there is a false perception of confidentiality.36 A false
perception of confidentiality can eventually cause the candor of participants to be mitigated if expectation is not matched with reality;
or, it can hurt the credibility of the mediation process in the eyes of
the general public.37 Proponents also argue that confidentiality does
not necessarily hamper litigation because it is likely that the information being withheld would never have arisen absent the mediation
and the perception of confidentiality.38 The UMA was drafted in the
midst of this debate on the scope of confidentiality.39
III. THE UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT AND ITS APPROACH TO
CONFIDENTIALITY
An ultimate goal of the UMA is to promote uniformity in an area
of law that has varied greatly from state to state.40 To accomplish
this, the drafters have sought to make the rules as predictable and
simple as possible in the hope that it will encourage adoption of the
Act.41 Confidentiality has become a major focus due to the many
variations among the states. An important policy of the UMA is to
ensure that the confidentiality protections of the Act are in line with
the reasonable expectations of the parties.42 A focused set of rules has
been drafted that participants can refer to when making decisions
regarding what they want to disclose.43
The UMA has chosen to significantly expand confidentiality protections beyond what the majority of states currently allow.44 The
drafters were fully aware that these rules make it more difficult to
admit evidence in a subsequent judicial proceeding. However, they
felt it was justified because the drafters viewed the “issue of confidentiality” as an essential element “that will help increase the likelihood that the mediation process will be fair.”45 “Fairness is enhanced
if it will be conducted with integrity and the parties’ knowing consent

36. Id. at 42.
37. Id. at 42-43.
38. Id. at 44.
39. Undoubtedly, this debate was also a central issue during the many revisions of
the UMA that were necessary before a final version could be ratified.
40. See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Prefatory Note pt. 3 (2001).
41. See id.
42. Id.
43. Dillard, supra note 4, at 151.
44. 1 COLE ET AL., supra note 7, at § 8.1 app. A, B.
45. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Prefatory Note (2001).
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will be preserved.”46 Many provisions in the UMA illustrate the
drafters’ resolve to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.47
The UMA has given a broad definition of communication for purposes of the Act.48 It includes “statements that are made orally,
through conduct, or in writing or other recorded activity.”49 The protection provided is also similar to the attorney-client privilege protection in that a mediator’s mental impressions and observations and
work product are considered communications for purposes of the
privilege.50
The UMA has created a broad confidentiality privilege that applies to the participants and the mediator. “A mediation party may
refuse to disclose, and may prevent any other person from disclosing,
a mediation communication.”51 The mediator holds a limited privilege
in that he or she can only prevent his or her own communications
from being disclosed.52 The privilege is also extended to any other
parties present at the mediation.53 This extended privilege has been
the subject of widespread debate.54
The UMA has listed a number of specific statutory exceptions for
which the privilege does not apply because of public policy reasons.55
These exceptions include threats to commit bodily injuries or crimes
of violence, communications used to plan or commit a crime, evidence
of professional misconduct or malpractice, and evidence of abuse or
neglect.56 Evidence of this type is automatically outside of the privilege.57 The Act also lists some other exceptions that would be admissible if deemed appropriate at an in-camera hearing.58
Section three, one of the most significant portions of the UMA,
deals with scope of the Act.59 This section states that the Act applies
to mediations that are ordered by the court,60 which is common. In
addition, the Act applies to mediations in which the participants

46. Id.
47. See id.
48. See id. § 2(2) (“‘Mediation communication’ means a statement, whether oral or in
a record or verbal or nonverbal, that occurs during a mediation or is made for purposes of
considering, conducting, participating in, initiating, continuing, or reconvening a mediation or retaining a mediator.").
49. Id. § 2(2), Reporter’s Notes.
50. Id.
51. Id. § 4(b)(1).
52. Id. § 4(b)(2).
53. Id. § 4(b)(3).
54. See detailed discussion infra Part IV.
55. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 6 (2001).
56. Id. § 6(a).
57. Id. § 6, Reporter’s Notes.
58. Id. § 6(b).
59. Id. § 3.
60. Id. § 3(a)(1).
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agree to mediate, and in any mediation conducted by a person who
holds himself or herself out as a mediator.61 This effectively extends
the confidentiality protection under the UMA to all presuit and voluntary mediations. This broad coverage is a departure from traditional state statutes that provide for enforceability of court-ordered
mediation or mediation for particular types of disputes.62 Not only
does section three extend the confidentiality privilege to all types of
mediation, it also applies to administrative proceedings and other areas in which the Rules of Evidence do not apply.63
These provisions of the UMA reflect the drafters’ intent to promote candor through confidentiality.64 In addition to uniformity and
confidentiality, the purpose of the UMA is to “encourage the policy of
fostering prompt, economical, and amicable resolution of disputes in
accordance with principles of integrity of the mediation process, active party involvement, and informed self-determination by the parties.”65 The drafters of the Act, along with the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, argue that the time is ripe to
adopt a uniform law of mediation.66 States have now had the time to
engage in experimentation with different approaches to mediation,
and clear trends have emerged.67 Florida and every other state
should at least evaluate the UMA to see if there are aspects of their
current approach that can be improved.
IV. MEDIATION IN FLORIDA AND ITS APPROACH TO CONFIDENTIALITY
Florida has been at the forefront of the mediation movement as
one of the first states to officially recognize the value of ADR in the
legal system.68 Privileges in Florida are statutorily created, not developed by judicial decision.69 Florida utilizes the statutory system
and the rules of civil procedure to both encourage and require mandatory mediation.
Chapter 44, Florida Statutes, titled “Mediation Alternatives To
Judicial Action,” is the most significant legislation pertaining to mediation. Florida defines mediation as “a process whereby a . . .
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. § 3(a)(2)-(3).
Id. § 3, Reporter’s Notes.
Id.
Id., Prefatory Note.
Id.
Id., Prefatory Note pt. 4.
Id.
SHARON PRESS, A SKILL-BUILDING FOR FAMILY LAW MEDIATORS/THE FLORIDA BAR
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION COMMITTEE AND THE FAMILY LAW SECTION 1-1 (Florida
Bar 2000) [hereinafter FAMILY LAW MEDIATORS].
69. Perry S. Itkin, IN RE: Amendments to the Fl Rules for Certified and Courtappointed Mediators—Revisions to the Fl Rules, in FAMILY LAW MEDIATORS, supra note 68,
at 2-1.

494

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:487

mediator acts to encourage and facilitate the resolution of a dispute
between two or more parties.”70
It further describes mediation as an informal and nonadversarial
process, the goal of which is to help the parties reach a mutually acceptable and voluntary agreement.71 Unfortunately, the rules that
stress a voluntary and nonadversarial process only pertain to courtordered mediation. Opposing sides have already been involved in
litigation by the time the court orders mediation. Resolution of a dispute is harder to achieve after litigation has begun and emotional
feelings about a case have been influenced. Upon the request of one
party to a civil action in Florida, the court is required to order both
parties to attend mediation.72 There are a few stated exceptions to
this rule such as medical malpractice, a landlord-tenant dispute, and
a claim for a debt.73
The statute also provides a specific privilege of confidentiality to
the participants in the mediation. This privilege states that “[e]ach
party . . . has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent any person present at the proceeding from disclosing, communications made
during such proceeding.”74 However, confidential communications
may be disclosed during disciplinary proceedings filed against mediators, although references to the privileged communications are deleted from the record prior to the release of any disciplinary files to
the public.75 Ultimately, the statute grants wide discretion to the
courts, providing that court-ordered mediation is conducted according to the rules of practice and procedure adopted by the Florida Supreme Court.76
The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure also provide a statutory basis
for mediation.77 The presiding judge in any civil matter has the
authority to mandate mediation before trial.78 Judges may liberally
use this discretion to settle disputes before trial in order to ease the
burden of overcrowded courts.79 In addition, the rules also permit any
party to move to disqualify a mediator for good cause, and provide
guidelines for scheduling and completing the mediation.80

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

FLA. STAT. § 44.1011(2) (2002).
Id.
Id. § 44.102(2)(a).
Id. §§ 44.102(2)(a)(1)-(8).
Id. § 44.102(3).
Id. § 44.102(4); see infra Part IV.
FLA. STAT. § 44.103(1) (2002).
FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.700(a).
Id.
UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Prefatory Note (2001).
FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.700(a)-(d).

2003]

CONFIDENTIALITY IN MEDIATION

495

The Florida Supreme Court has promulgated the Florida Rules for
Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators.81 These rules govern mediator qualifications, standards of professional conduct, and discipline. The rules state that the mediation proceedings are confidential
and declare that a violation of confidentiality by a mediator could result in removal by the Chief Justice of the Florida Supreme Court.82
However, this confidentiality only extends until sanctions are imposed, which suggests that the duty to remain confidential is inferior
to a court order to testify at trial.83 Because Florida has adopted a
specific set of rules that apply only to court-ordered mediation, the
policies need to be re-examined in light of the growth of voluntary
mediation in this country.
V. WHAT BENEFIT CAN FLORIDA GLEAN FROM
THE UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT?
A. Comparison of the UMA to Florida’s Proposed Mediation Bill
The UMA is purported to be a culmination of the best mediation
trends that have developed in the last thirty years.84 This has not
gone unnoticed by lawmakers in Florida. The Florida Senate Judiciary Committee recently approved a “bill that would establish new
confidentiality protections in pre-suit and voluntary . . . mediation.”85
The bill, Senate Bill 1226, has also received the unanimous approval
of the Senate Taxation and Finance Committee.86 “Sharon Press, director of the Florida Dispute Resolution Center, said the bill would
‘create both a privilege and confidentiality protections’ that will be
‘tried out in family mediations with the intent of extending [the protections] to all civil cases.’”87 The bill represents a response to the
Uniform Mediation Act and has adopted some of the Act’s measures
in regard to confidentiality.88
A major provision of the bill, relating to confidentiality in mediation, is the extension of coverage to voluntary and presuit mediation.
Presuit mediation will entail any matters “which are in dispute and
for which the persons disputing the matters agree to submit to mediation before the initiation of any legal proceeding.”89 This new ap-

81. FLA. R. MED. 10.020.
82. Id. 10.260.
83. See id.
84. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Prefatory Note pt. 4, 5 (2001).
85. Justin Kelly, Florida Senate Committee Passes Mediation Confidentiality Bill,
ADRWorld.com (Mar. 1, 2002), at http://www.adrworld.com/opendocument.asp?Doc=WRl9
SCJ19U&code=b8ne1tSm (last visited Mar. 30, 2003) (on file with author).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Fla. CS for SB 1226, § 10(g) (2002) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 44.1011(2)).
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proach is effectively the same as the coverage adopted by the UMA
and is a significant extension of Florida’s current law.
B. Why Florida’s Current Mediation Statutes are not Sufficient
Presently, all statutory coverage of mediation is limited to courtordered mediation.90 The statute does not cover presuit and voluntary mediation disputes, and they do not fall under the protection of
the confidentiality privilege.91 Parties of a non-court-ordered mediation who desire to preserve the confidentiality of the process must
rely on a signed confidentiality agreement.92 A contractual agreement
does provide some measure of protection, but it pales in comparison
to Florida’s statutory privilege, which approaches an absolute immunity for participants.93
Extending protection to voluntary and presuit mediation will increase the public’s faith in these areas of mediation. As discussed
earlier, this faith in the process will make mediations more effective
by promoting candor. Further, as public faith in the confidentiality of
voluntary and presuit mediation increases, so should participation.
An increase in participation coincides with Florida’s goal of expanding mediation by encouraging its use on a voluntary basis.94
One of the principal goals of mediation, and ADR in general, is to
promote resolution of disputes without having to resort to the judicial process. This goal will be stifled if statutory protection is not
provided for voluntary and presuit mediation. In today’s society, it is
theoretically safer to file suit, thereby gaining the protection of the
confidentiality privilege, before attempting to mediate. Adopting
Senate Bill 1226 will allow parties to enter mediation and obtain the
protection of the statute without ever entering the judicial system. In
order to encourage parties to utilize mediation as an alternative to
litigation, it makes sense to give people every incentive to avoid the
judicial system.
Making confidential mediation more accessible to the public creates an attractive alternative to litigation. The proposed bill adopts
another provision that appears to be taken directly from the UMA.
Senate Bill 1226 creates specific exceptions to the confidentiality
privilege for communications concerning abuse or neglect, evidence of
acts or threats of violence, and professional misconduct committed
90. FLA. STAT. § 44.102 (2002).
91. See id.
92. Itkin, supra note 69.
93. See Aaron J. Lodge, Legislation Protecting Confidentiality in Mediation: Armor of
Steel or Eggshells?, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1093, 1107-08 (2001).
94. See Fla. CS for SB 1226, § 11 (2002) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 44.1012) (codifying the
intent of the legislature to promote a range of alternative methods to resolve disputes in
order to reduce the level of costly court intervention).
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during the mediation.95 These exceptions are the same as the UMA’s
automatic exceptions.96
Interestingly, there is one proposed addition to Florida’s mediation law that is not in the UMA and, in fact, was purposely left out of
the Act.97 This section requests that the Florida Supreme Court establish a formal process by which settlement agreements may be
filed and approved through a court order without requiring the parties to appear in court.98 The purpose of this provision is to help ease
the burden of overcrowded courts by eliminating the necessity of a
court appearance. The process would “provide notice to the parties
regarding their right to a hearing, include safeguards to prevent the
filing or acceptance of agreements reached under duress or coercion,
and provide for a hearing if the court determines that such a hearing
is necessary.”99
The drafters of the UMA recommended against the judicial enforcement of mediation settlement agreements because of the possibility that more sophisticated parties could use it to take advantage
of others.100 However, the proposed provision offers some advantages.
If parties attend presuit mediation, they can achieve judicial enforcement of a settlement agreement without ever having to go to
court. In terms of time and money, the savings to the parties and the
court can be substantial. Another section of the bill provides for the
creation of a pilot program to test the proposed changes to the mediation law.101 These provisions offer enough potential advantages that
the changes should at least be thoroughly tested.
Senate Bill 1226, also called the Family Court Reform Bill, represents Florida’s first attempt to incorporate portions of the UMA into
Florida’s existing mediation law. Note that the portion of the bill relating to mediation is but a small part of comprehensive legislation
aimed at family court reform in general. Ultimately, even though the
bill has not been successfully passed into law, the bill is noteworthy
because it represents the current mindset of today’s Legislature and
its view regarding mediation and the UMA.
Extension of the protection to cover voluntary and presuit mediation is a necessary step in light of the growth of mediation and the
benefits mediation brings to our judicial system. A list of statutory
exceptions is necessary for public policy reasons and to ensure a cer95. Id. § 12(3) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 44.1025).
96. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 6 (2001).
97. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Contract and Conflict Management, 2001 WIS. L. REV.
831, 903 n.419.
98. Fla. CS for SB 1226, § 14 (2002) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 44.1025).
99. Id.
100. Stipanowich, supra note 97.
101. Fla. CS for SB 1226, § 16 (2002) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 44.202).
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tain amount of predictability. The bill provides some very important
changes to Florida law based on the UMA. But it fails to address the
UMA’s approach to the confidentiality privilege in general.
C. Differing Approaches to Privileges in Mediation
Two general variations exist in states that designate a statutory
confidentiality privilege.102 Some states give a privilege to both the
mediator and the participants, while others only extend the privilege
to mediation participants.103 Florida follows the more narrow approach and limits the confidentiality privilege to the participants.104
This grants a party to the mediation the right to refuse disclosure
and prevent any other person present at the mediation from disclosing communications made at the proceeding.105 If, however, the participants waive the privilege or the court demands that the mediator
testify, the individual will be forced to disclose everything that was
discussed at the mediation, including his personal thoughts and work
product.106
States that adopt a broad privilege extend its coverage to the participants and the mediator.107 Similarly, under the UMA, the mediator has the authority to refuse to disclose the contents of the mediation, regardless of the parties’ or the court’s request, with some exceptions.108 The privilege also empowers the mediator with the right
to block other parties from divulging the contents of the mediation
unless all parties agree that a party should testify about a party’s
mediation communications.109 Drafters could look to these prevailing
models for guidance.
The underlying goals and principles of the UMA greatly influenced the drafters’ decision when forming the UMA’s confidentiality
privilege. As mentioned earlier, a primary goal of the UMA is to
promote candor during mediation by sustaining the expectations of
the parties and the mediator regarding the confidentiality of the mediation process.110 Parties are less likely to be sincere if there is a
possibility, however remote, that what is said could later be used to
their detriment in a judicial proceeding.111 Attorneys will point this
out to clients and often advise against disclosing facts that may be
102. Rufenacht, supra note 2, at 118.
103. Id. at 118-19.
104. FLA. STAT. § 44.102(3) (2002).
105. Id.
106. See Ellen E. Deason, Enforcing Mediated Settlement Agreements: Contract Law
Collides with Confidentiality, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 33, 69-70 & n.138 (2001).
107. See Rufenacht, supra note 2, at 118-19.
108. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 4, Reporter’s Notes (2001).
109. Id. § 4, Reporter’s Notes pt. 4.
110. Id., Prefatory Note pt. 1.
111. See Dillard, supra note 4, at 140.
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crucial to settlement.112 Further, the drafters felt that forcing a mediator to testify would erode public confidence in the mediation process.113 In an attempt to accomplish both goals, the drafters combined
the two approaches.
Under the UMA, the participants hold an absolute privilege that
can be raised in regard to any communication made during the mediation.114 By contrast, the mediator holds a limited privilege. The
limited privilege allows the mediator to decline to disclose a mediation communication; however, he or she can only prevent others from
disclosing one of the mediator’s own communications.115 This
privilege is much closer to a broad privilege than a narrow one, however, because mediators can withhold confidential communications
and work product.116
Those who oppose a broad privilege believe it is unnecessary and
argue that adequate protection for the parties already exists in the
form of statutes and the Rules of Evidence.117 Critics argue that the
UMA provides mediators “with more protections against testifying
than are necessary.”118 In other confidential relationships, such as
the attorney-client privilege, on which the UMA provision is based,
“the privilege against testifying belongs to the part[ies] and can be
waived.”119 Under the UMA, mediators have a separate privilege and
can refuse any request to testify.120 However, “[i]f a mediator is accused of malpractice, he [or she can] waive [the] confidentiality
[privilege] and testify in order to defend himself or herself.”121
In addition to being able to defend themselves, mediators can also
force the mediation parties to testify.122 However, a party may not
compel the mediator to testify when the party is seeking to overturn
the settlement agreement.123 Further, there are certain situations in
which mediation testimony should expressly be allowed.124 Testimony
should be allowed in challenges to the mediation process.125 While

112. See generally Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 16 (explaining that expectations of
confidentiality, regarding both the mediation process and the mediator, could lead to disclosure of information that would be unfairly prejudicial at a subsequent legal proceeding).
113. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Prefatory Note pt. 1 (2001).
114. Id. § 4(b)(1).
115. Id. § 4(b)(2).
116. Id. § 4, Reporter’s Notes pt. 4(a)(3).
117. Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 16, at 39.
118. Andrea K. Schneider, Which Means to an End Under the Uniform Mediation Act?,
85 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 3 (2001).
119. Id.
120. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 4(2).
121. Schneider, supra note 118, at 3; UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 6(a)(6).
122. Schneider, supra note 118, at 3-4.
123. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 4(b)(2).
124. Id. § 6(a).
125. See DeMayo, supra note 20, at 394-95.
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mediators strive to be completely impartial, there may be times when
a mediator favors one side; a party should be allowed to challenge the
process with the use of all relevant evidence if such a situation
arises. Testimony should be allowed in claims that are not connected
to the underlying mediation.126 By entering mediation, the parties
should not be deemed to have waived their legal rights in another
proceeding that they did “not contemplate[], [or] which may not have
even existed, at the time of the mediation.”127 Testimony in other proceedings cannot be used against the parties, so allowing mediation
communications should not affect the candor of the parties.
Adopting a narrow approach is more in line with the direction
taken by the courts, which have favored a narrowing of existing
privileges and have refused to recognize new ones.128 Leaving the
privilege in the hands of the parties provides options to the participants in the actual dispute. If a compelling need for disclosure arises,
the parties can waive their privilege or turn to the courts. The rights
of participants will not be blocked by giving a privilege to a neutral
third party.
Despite these arguments, the protection currently provided in
Florida’s statutes and the Rules of Evidence is not enough. Florida
has an absolute privilege for the participants, but it does not provide
adequate protection for the confidentiality of the mediation process
and should be expanded. In Florida, the mediator does not have a
privilege, and a party is permitted to testify and subpoena the mediator’s testimony if the other party waives the privilege by alleging
duress or intimidation.129 Further, courts have sometimes skirted
narrowly construed privileges and required a mediator to testify
against the parties’ wishes.130 This is problematic because confidentiality and the appearance of impartiality are essential to the mediation process and these characteristics influence the public’s confidence in mediation.131
D. Expectations of the Parties in Mediation
Public confidence in mediation will grow if people trust “that the
mediator will not take sides or disclose their statements.”132 “The
public confidence rationale has been extended to permit the mediator
to object to testifying,” thereby allowing the mediator to remain neu-
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Id. at 396.
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See Ehrhardt, supra note 6, at 114.
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See Olam v. Cong. Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1139 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
Weston, supra note 27, 640.
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tral in future mediation sessions involving comparable parties.133
This neutrality will dissipate if litigation forces a mediator into the
position of a tie-breaking witness.134 Mediator testimony should be
limited to circumstances in which there is a strong public policy in
favor of disclosure,135 such as the specific exceptions in the UMA.
A broad privilege, such as the one adopted by the UMA, offers advantages that can enhance the overall success of the mediation process in Florida. One of the UMA’s principal benefits is that it favors
enforceable standards among the participants, the mediator, and
third parties present at the mediation.136 Having a focused privilege
such as this keeps the privilege in line with the reasonable expectations of the parties.137 Predictability is an important component of
these expectations because it “is necessary for [the] parties to feel
confident in using the mediation process.”138
Finally, Florida should adopt the mediator privilege to achieve the
goal of state law uniformity. As previously mentioned, the myriad of
different state laws regarding mediation has caused problems, particularly in today’s market of interstate commerce such as the Internet. The law of the state in which the litigation is located usually determines privileges,139 so it is possible for confidentiality to be determined by the law of a state other than the state in which a mediation
takes place.140 This situation may potentially confuse mediation participants and is not in line with the reasonable expectations of the
parties.
VI. CONCLUSION
Florida’s approach to mediation has been remarkably successful
since its inception in the early 1980s, particularly considering the
few statutes available to provide guidance when the proposal was
drafted. However, the recent adoption of the UMA should cause Florida to reconsider its current approach to mediation. Critics argue the
old adage, “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it,”141 but Florida did not become
a leader in the ADR movement by remaining content with the status
133. Id.; see, e.g., NLRB v. Macaluso, 618 F.2d 51, 54 (9th Cir. 1980) (“Public interest
in maintaining the perceived and actual impartiality of . . . mediators does outweigh the
benefits derivable from [a given mediator’s testimony].”).
134. Alan Kirtley, Best of Both Worlds: Uniform Mediation Privilege Should Draw from
Both Absolute and Qualified Approaches, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 1998, at 5, 5.
135. Weston, supra note 27, at 642.
136. Dillard, supra note 4, at 147.
137. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 4, Reporter’s Notes pt. 2(a).
138. Schneider, supra note 118, at 4.
139. Kirtley, supra note 134, at 5.
140. Id.
141. See, e.g., Thomas F. Christian, Running Statewide Dispute Resolution Programs—
The New York Experience, 81 KY. L.J. 1093, 1100-01 (1993).
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quo. Developments over the past thirty years have given states the
chance to experiment with many different approaches to ADR, and
clear trends have emerged.142 The UMA is a culmination of the best
of these trends, and there are several provisions that Florida should
adopt.
Whether through the Family Court Reform Bill or some future
legislation, Florida should extend the confidentiality protection to
cover voluntary and presuit mediation. This will encourage parties to
use the mediation process without having to resort to the judicial
system, and further Florida’s goal of expanding the use of ADR. Florida should also follow the UMA’s lead and adopt a limited mediator
privilege. Adopting this privilege will increase the public’s confidence
in the mediation process and foster its growth. This confidence will
also make mediations more effective by encouraging candor among
the participants. The UMA statutory exceptions are an indispensable
companion to this heightened privilege that Florida should also
adopt. In all, these measures coincide with Florida’s goal of increasing the use and effectiveness of ADR. Florida has been a leader in
mediation from the beginning of the movement. Implementing these
portions of the UMA provide an opportunity for Florida to once again
take a leadership role in crafting mediation in the future.

142. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Prefatory Note pt. 4.

